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ABSTRACT 
Radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) have been a major 
weapon of choice by the insurgents in Operation Iraqi Freedom since 2003.  One 
effective way to prevent an RCIED attack is to use electronic jamming devices to 
interfere with the communication between the trigger and the bomb itself.  Due to power 
constraints and other considerations, however, a jammer usually cannot jam all triggers 
simultaneously.  In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models to study both active 
jamming and reactive jamming.  For active jamming, we compute the optimal mixed 
strategy by linear programming; for reactive jamming, we use an iterative method.  
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1 Introduction
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a bomb manufactured and deployed in ways other
than by conventional military actions. The IED has become an increasingly popular and
effective weapon of destruction in modern warfare, and has been used extensively by the
insurgents in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These IED attacks result in casualties among both
the coalition forces and civilians, and significantly undermine any reconstruction effort.
Radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) refer to an IED that is detonated
by a radio signal. To detonate RCIEDs, the insurgents use commercially available products as
wireless triggers such as walkie-talkies, cellular phones, and garage door openers. One way to
counter the RCIED attacks is to use an electronic jamming device that emits electro-magnetic
waves to interfere with the communication between the wireless trigger and the bomb itself
[1]. However, in some cases, it is impossible to jam the entire frequency spectrum because
the jammer has limited power and, in some other cases, it is desirable to leave open some
frequency bands for wireless communications. Consequently, the effectiveness of jamming
is highly dependent on how the jamming power is allocated among frequency bands. The
traditional approach to this power-allocation problem is to predict what RCIED triggers the
insurgents will use, based on recent attack data. The flaw of this approach is that, by the
time a new jamming strategy is deployed, the insurgents may have already switched to a
different set of RCIED triggers.
In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models between the insurgents and the coalition
forces. The insurgents choose a wireless trigger to detonate an RCIED, while the coalition
forces decide how to allocate jamming power among frequency bands. The insurgents want
to maximize the expected damage caused by the RCIED, while the coalition forces want to
minimize it. Because the game-theoretic models treat insurgents as an active player, the
derived optimal jamming strategies do not rely on past attack data and are robust against
adaptive insurgents.
We consider two types of jamming technology: active jamming and reactive jamming.
With active jamming, the jammer emits electro-magnetic waves in preselected frequency
bands, hoping that these selected bands include those used by the RCIEDs planted in the
area. With reactive jamming, the jammer first scans the entire frequency spectrum to detect
radio signals before allocating its jamming power. Both jamming models are formulated
as two-person zero-sum games. In the case of active jamming, we solve the problem by a
linear program; in the case of reactive jamming, we use an iterative method to compute the
optimal solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the game-theoretic
model for jamming RCIEDs. Sections 3 and 4 discuss active jamming and reactive jamming,
respectively. Section 5 presents numerical experiments, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a two-person zero-sum game played by Red (the insurgents) and Blue (the coalition
forces). Red chooses a wireless triggering device (henceforth trigger) to detonate an RCIED,
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while Blue uses an electronic jammer to interfere with the detonation signal. Let T =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the set of all triggers available to Red, and B = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of
all frequency bands used by these triggers.
For i ∈ T , and j ∈ B, let
ai,j =
￿
1, if trigger i uses band j,
0, otherwise.
Most triggers use a single band, while some others can automatically scan several bands to
find an open one, such as a quad-band cellular phone. An example with m = 5 and n = 8
is depicted in Table 1, where triggers 1 and 2 each uses a single band, while triggers 3–5
each use multiple bands. Also shown in Table 1 are two parameters associated with each
trigger: damage and power. The parameter di specifies the damage if an attack via RCIED
i is successful, i ∈ T . In some cases, it is possible to establish correlations between wireless
triggers and the explosive material, in which case it may be desirable to assign different
damage values to different triggers. Otherwise, one can assign di = 1 for all i ∈ T , and
the objective function becomes the probability of a successful RCIED attack. The other
parameter wi refers to the power necessary to jam trigger i, i ∈ T .
Table 1: An example with m = 5 and n = 8. RCIEDs 1 and 2 each use a single band, while
RCIEDs 3, 4, and 5 each use multiple bands.
Frequency Bands
Trigger Damage Power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1.0 0.7 1
2 1.1 0.5 1
3 1.2 1.0 1 1
4 1.3 1.2 1 1 1
5 1.4 1.1 1 1 1 1
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with simultaneous moves. Red chooses one
trigger from T = {1, . . . ,m} to detonate the RCIED, so Red has m pure strategies. Blue’s
decision is how to allocate the total jamming power among the frequency bands, which
depends on the jamming technology, namely active jamming and reactive jamming. We
discuss these two types of jamming technology separately in the next two sections.
3 Active Jamming
With active jamming, Blue has to decide at the onset how to allocate his jamming power.
Denote the total jamming power by w, and a feasible strategy is an allocation of jamming
power among n bands as long as the total does not exceed w. Although this definition results
in infinitely many pure strategies, we can trim them down by the following arguments.
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First, each of Blue’s pure strategy can be defined by the set of triggers it jams. If two pure
strategies jam the same set of triggers, they should be regarded as the same pure strategy
even if they have a different power allocation. For instance, in Table 1, allocating power 0.7
to band 1 is equivalent to allocating power 0.8 to band 1, as both of them jam trigger 1, but
nothing else. Because there are m triggers, this observation ensures that the total number
of Blue’s pure strategies is, at most, 2m. We refer a subset of T as a loadset, and there are
2m loadsets.
Second, for each of these 2m loadsets, we can eliminate those that are infeasible; that is,
those loadsets that require more than a total power w. Third, we can remove dominated
loadsets. For instance, if it is feasible to jam triggers {1, 2, 4} all at once, then any loadset
that is a subset of {1, 2, 4} is dominated. For a given total power, let L denote the set of all
loadsets after applying these three steps.
Let l = |L| denote the number of Blue’s pure strategies after applying these three steps.
The value l depends on the total jamming power available w. When w is small, there are
few pure strategies because most of loadsets are infeasible. When w is large, there are also
few pure strategies because most of the loadsets are dominated. The value of l tends to be
at its largest possible value when w is about half of the total power required to jam all m
triggers.
To write the two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form, note that the size
of the matrix is m× l. Red chooses one of the m triggers to use, while Blue chooses a loadset




0, if Blue’s loadset k jams trigger i;
di, otherwise.
(1)
Using the example in Table 1, and supposing w = 5, we can write the game in the standard
matrix form in a 5× 4 matrix, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: The 5× 4 matrix game derived from the example in Table 1, assuming w = 5. The
payoff is equal to 0 if the trigger is jammed, or equal to di otherwise.
Red’s Pure Strategy Blue’s Pure Strategy (Loadset)
(Trigger) {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {2,5} {3,4}
1 0 0 1.0 1.0
2 0 0 0 1.1
3 0 1.2 1.2 0
4 1.3 0 1.3 0
5 1.4 1.4 0 1.4
A two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form can be solved by a linear
program; for example, see Section 3.10 in Washburn [6]. In Table 2, Red’s optimal mixed
strategy is to choose each of the five triggers with probabilities
(0.248, 0, 0.207, 0.191, 0.354),
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and Blue’s optimal mixed strategy is to use each of the four loadsets with probabilities
(0.104, 0.152, 0.468, 0.276).
The value of the game is 0.7442—the expected damage caused by an attempted RCIED
attack.
4 Reactive Jamming
With reactive jamming, the jammer first scans the entire frequency spectrum to detect
radio signals, and then decides which loadset to use. The radio signal can originate from a
legitimate use of wireless devices (regular use of cell phones), or it can be a signal to detonate
an RCIED. The jammer, however, is not capable of determining the nature of a radio signal.
Because a reactive jammer detects radio signals, its effectiveness is highly dependent on
the radio environment of the operational theater. For instance, in a desert there is usually
little radio traffic, so most likely the jammer can jam all detected radio signals. In an urban
area, the jammer is likely to detect a lot of radio signals, which cannot be blocked all at
once by a feasible loadset. Consequently, the jammer needs to decide which loadset to use.
Let αj denote the probability that frequency band j is used by a legitimate wireless device,
j ∈ B. If αj ≈ 0, then a radio signal in band j is a good indication that Red deploys an
RCIED that uses band j. If αj ≈ 1, then a radio signal in band j does not render much
information. Consequently, we expect the effectiveness of a reactive jammer to increase as
αj decreases, for j ∈ B.
In the two-person zero-sum game with reactive jamming, Red wants to maximize the
expected damage, while Blue wants to minimize it. Red’s mixed strategy can be delineated
by p = (p1, . . . , pm), with pi denoting the probability of using trigger i, i ∈ T . Blue’s
strategy, however, is much more complicated, as Blue needs to specify the loadset to use
after first detecting the radio signals. In other words, a pure strategy for Blue needs to
specify a loadset for each possible subset of B. Because there are 2n subsets of B, the total
number of Blue’s pure strategies is l(2
n). For the problem in Table 1, there are 4(2
8) = 4256
pure strategies for Blue. Consequently, it is not computationally feasible to express the two-
person zero-sum game with reactive jamming in the standard matrix form, as in the case of
active jamming.
Let 2B denote the power set of B, which is the set of all subsets of B. An equivalent
way to express Blue’s mixed strategy is to write qk(D), for k ∈ L, and for each D ∈ 2B,
with the interpretation that when Blue detects radio signals in D, he uses loadset k with
probability qk(D). In this paper, we use an iterative method to numerically compute the
optimal mixed strategy for both players. In the first iteration, each player arbitrarily chooses
a pure strategy. In the nth iteration, n ≥ 2, each player uses the best pure strategy against
his opponent’s mixture of strategies used in the first n − 1 iterations. This method was
suggested by Brown [2] and proved by Robinson [3] to yield the optimal mixed strategy for
both players.
To use this iterative method, we need to be able to compute the best pure strategy
for either player against the opponent’s mixed strategy. In Section 4.1, we discuss how to
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determine Blue’s best loadset against Red’s mixed strategy. In Section 4.2, we discuss how
to determine Red’s best trigger against Blue’s mixed strategy. In Section 4.3, we present an
algorithm for this iterative method.
4.1 Blue’s Best Loadset Against Red’s Mixed Strategy
We first consider Blue’s best strategy against Red’s mixed strategy. Let pi denote the
probability that Red uses trigger i, and let p = (p1, . . . , pm) denote Red’s mixed strategy.
With reactive jamming, Blue first identifies the set of bands where radio signals are present,
and then decides which loadset to use.
Let D ∈ 2B denote the set of bands where radio signals are detected. Recall that αj
denotes the probability that there is legitimate use of frequency band j, j ∈ B. Let
Si ≡ {j : ai,j = 1} (2)
denote the set of bands that trigger i uses, i ∈ T . Define 1A as the indicator function, which
takes value 1 if A is true or 0 otherwise. Using Bayes’ formula (see, for example, Ross [4]),
we can derive







If there exists a subset of D, denoted by C ⊆ D, such that αj = 0 for j ∈ C, then Blue
knows the signals in bands C are due to an RCIED attack. Therefore, Red must be using a
trigger that uses all bands in C. In this case, the probability it is trigger i, for i such that




If αj > 0 for all j ∈ D, then by dividing
￿
j∈D αj in both the numerator and the















where the equality follows because Si ⊆ D implies that Si ∩D = Si. In other words, we can
first rule out those triggers whose corresponding bands are not a subset of D; if Si ⊆ D for




Equation (3) allows Blue to compute the probability that trigger i is being used, based
on detected radio signals D ∈ 2B and Red’s mixed strategy p = (p1, . . . , pm). Blue can
use these probabilities to compute the expected damage for each feasible loadset in L, and
choose the one that minimizes the expected damage. In the case when two or more loadsets
tie for optimum, Blue can choose any of them arbitrarily.
Generally speaking, Blue’s optimal strategy is complicated. One special case, when it
can be determined explicitly, is given in the proposition below.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose all triggers use a distinctive single band and require the same
amount of power to jam; that is, T = B = {1, . . . ,m}, and Si = {i} and wi = 1 for i ∈ T .
Sort all triggers into a priority list according to dipi/αi, with the first trigger having the
largest such ratio. Let D denote the set of bands where radio signals are detected. Blue’s
optimal strategy is to follow the list to jam up to ￿w￿ triggers whose corresponding band is
in D.
Proof. According to Equation (4), the probability that trigger i is used, i ∈ D, is
P (Red uses trigger i | radio signals detected in D) = pi/αi￿
k∈D pk/αk
.
Because wi = 1 for all i, Blue can jam up to ￿w￿ bands, or equivalently, ￿w￿ triggers, as
each trigger uses one distinctive band. Consequently, the strategy prescribed in the corollary
jams the triggers that have the highest expected damage, thereby minimizing the expected
damage. ✷
4.2 Red’s Best Trigger Against Blue’s Mixed Strategy
Blue’s mixed strategy can be delineated by qk(D), such that loadset k is selected with prob-
ability qk(D), when radio signals are detected in D ∈ 2B. To compute the expected damage
by using trigger i for a given Blue’s mixed strategy, we can first compute the conditional
expected damage for a given set of background radio signals (radio signals due to legitimate
uses of wireless devices as opposed to signals due to an RCIED trigger). This technique can
be found in, for example, Chapter 3 of Ross [5]. Let R ∈ 2B denote the set of bands with








When R occurs, Blue will detect radio signals in R ∪ Si, if Red uses trigger i, i ∈ T .









where vi,k is the damage if Red uses trigger i and Blue uses loadset k, as defined in Equa-
tion (1). Red can compare this expected damage for all triggers to determine which trigger
yields the largest expected damage.
4.3 Compute the Optimal Mixed Strategy
We use the iterative method suggested by Brown [2], which results in the following algorithm:
1. Initialize the algorithm by arbitrarily picking a strategy for both players. For trigger
i, i ∈ T , set ai = 1. For each D ∈ 2B and loadset k, k ∈ L, set bk(D) = 1.
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2. Update Red’s mixed strategy: Set pi = ai/
￿m
j=1 aj, i ∈ T . Update Blue’s mixed
strategy: For each D ∈ 2B, set qk(D) = bk(D)/
￿
j∈L bj(D), k ∈ L.
3. Compute Red’s best trigger against Blue’s mixed strategy derived in step 2, as discussed
in Section 4.2, and denote it by i∗. Compute Blue’s best loadset against Red’s mixed
strategy derived in step 2, as discussed in Section 4.1; denote by k∗(D) the best loadset
for D ∈ 2B.
4. Set ai∗ = ai∗ + 1. For each D ∈ 2B, set bk∗(D)(D) = bk∗(D)(D) + 1.
5. Repeat steps 2–4 for a predetermined number of times.
Robinson [3] proved that the mixed strategy produced by this procedure in step 2 con-
verges to the optimal mixed strategy for either player. Furthermore, in each iteration we
obtain a lower bound and an upper bound for the value of the game. The upper bound is
produced by Red’s best trigger against a feasible Blue’s mixed strategy in step 3, because
Blue can guarantee such expected damage with the chosen mixed strategy. Similarly, the
lower bound is produced by Blue’s best loadset against Red’s mixed strategy.
5 Numerical Experiments
This section presents numerical experiments to demonstrate our game-theoretic model and
its applications. The main example is summarized in Table 3, where Red chooses from 10
triggers, which together use 14 frequency bands. These mockup data are derived from open
sources to replicate a plausible, real-world scenario. In this example, we set the damage of
each trigger to 1, so that we can better interpret the result as the probability of an RCIED
attack.
First, consider the case of active jamming. As seen in Table 3, if the total jamming power
is less than 12 watts, then Red can use trigger 9 to guarantee a successful attack. On the
other hand, if the total jammer power is 30 watts or more, then it is possible to jam all
triggers at once. Consequently, we are interested in the case when the jamming power is
between 12 and 30 watts.
Figure 1 shows the value of the game (probability of an RCIED attack) as the function
of jamming power, which is solved by linear programming as discussed in Section 3. The
probability of attack decreases as a step function as the jamming power increases. The
biggest gain occurs when the jamming power reaches 12 watts, as the probability of RCIED
attack drops from 1 to 2/3. The rate of improvement stays flat in some areas (such as around
18, 22, and 26 watts), and increases rapidly in others (such as around 16, 20, 24, and 29
watts).
If Blue has several different types of jammers—some with more jamming power than the
others—and operates in several areas with different trigger availability, then Figure 1 can help
Blue decide how to allocate the different jammers among these areas. From the standpoint
of research and design, Blue can use Figure 1 to determine whether it is worthwhile to invest
7
Table 3: An example with m = 10 and n = 14. The damage is set to 1, so Red wants to
maximize the probability of attack, and Blue wants to minimize it.
Frequency Bands





5 1.9 1 1
6 2.0 1 1
7 2.5 1 1 1
8 2.9 1 1
9 3.0 1 1 1 1
10 2.8 1 1
in technology to increase the jamming power. For instance, increasing the jamming power
from 17 watts to 19 watts does not reduce the probability of attack at all.
We next consider reactive jamming, with which the jammer first scans the entire fre-
quency spectrum before deciding which loadset to use. One can expect the performance
of reactive jamming to depend a lot on the radio environment in the operational theater.
For instance, in a desert where there is little background radio traffic (radio signals due to
legitimate use of wireless devices), the jammer can almost always find a loadset to block
all possible triggers after first detecting radio signals. On the other hand, in an urban area
where people use a variety of wireless devices all the time, there may not be much difference
between active jamming and reactive jamming.
In our experiments, we assume the probability that each band has background radio
traffic is the same, so that we can better interpret the results; that is, αj = α, for all j ∈ B.
When α = 1, the reactive jammer detects radio signals in all the frequency bands, so listening
does not provide any additional information. Consequently, the case α = 1 with reactive
jamming coincides with the case of active jamming. The smaller the value of α, the less the
background traffic, and the more likely the reactive jammer can block all possible triggers
after first scanning the frequency spectrum. Consequently, the probability of a successful
RCIED attack increases as α increases.
We use the same example in Table 3, and consider three power levels: 18, 22, and 26
watts. Figure 2 shows the performance of reactive jamming as a function of α, which ranges
from 0.4 to 1. For each scenario, we run 100,000 iterations to estimate the value of the game
(probability of attack). The difference between the upper bound and the lower bound, in
each scenario, is less than 1% of the value of the game. The probability of attack is plotted
as a percentage to that of active jamming. In other words, the plot shows the improvement
of reactive jamming over active jamming.






























Figure 1: The value of the game (probability of a successful attack) with active jamming as
a function of the jamming power for the example in Table 3.
probability of attack drops significantly when α decreases from 1. Also seen in Figure 2,
the more the jamming power, the more the improvement of reactive jamming over active
jamming.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a combat model between Red (insurgents), who choose a wireless trigger
to detonate an RCIED, and Blue (coalition forces), who use an electronic jammer to prevent
an RCIED attack. We develop models for both active jamming and reactive jamming, as
well as algorithms to solve both these models. We demonstrate our findings with numerical
experiments.
Using game theory, our proposed jamming strategy is significant in two ways. First, Blue
does not need to estimate Red’s propensity for using each trigger. Blue’s optimal jamming
strategy depends only on the triggers available to Red, and takes into account the best Red
can do. Second, Blue’s optimal jamming strategy is randomized. A deterministic loadset
can become predictable. If the open bands remain the same, then the insurgents, after a
period of time, will learn about them and start to deploy wireless triggers to exploit those
open bands. In the worst case, it is possible for Red to deploy a certain set of triggers to
manipulate Blue into choosing a certain loadset, and then switch to another wireless trigger
to guarantee a successful RCIED attack. The proposed jamming strategy, based on game
theory, is robust against an intelligent and quick-learning enemy.
In our model, we assume that it costs the same for Red to use any trigger. This assump-































































Figure 2: Performance of reactive jamming as a function of the probability of background
radio traffic in each band for the problem in Table 3.
di/ci, each of Red’s active pure strategies (trigger selected with nonzero probability) will
yield the same expected-damage-to-cost ratio. Consider a scenario in which Red has a huge
budget, which is much larger than maxi∈T ci. By maximizing the expected-damage-to-cost
ratio of each RCIED attack, Red maximizes the total expected damage he can cause with
the given budget.
There are a few possible future research directions. On the practical side, effort is needed
to compile and feed the real-world data into the model, including the wireless triggers avail-
able and their specifications. On the theoretical side, it is interesting to see how Red can
exploit reactive jamming by using the other wireless devices at the same time of a planned
RCIED attack. Inundating the frequency bands with radio signals can confuse the reactive
jammer and reduce its effectiveness.
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